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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization's
(UNESCO) World Heritage Convention has been called "the most successful
global instrument for the protection of cultural and natural heritage,"' while
also being criticized as "an instrument of 'foreign domination.' ,2 Adopted by
the United Nations in 1972, the World Heritage Convention (the Convention)
is intended to identify, protect, and preserve cultural and natural heritage sites
of "outstanding universal value" around the world.3 Currently, 890 sites are
protected under the Convention,4 but not all of these listings were accepted
without controversy.5 The most recent controversial listing involves a border
dispute between Thailand and Cambodia. The controversy surrounds the
Temple of Preah Vihear and its inclusion on the World Heritage List (the List)
as a Cambodian site.6
When determining whether a site should be inscribed on the List, the World
Heritage Committee primarily determines whether the site meets one or more
of ten criteria for "outstanding universal value."7 A secondary consideration
Raechel Anglin, Note, The World Heritage List: Bridging the Cultural Property
Nationalism-Internationalism Divide, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 241, 247 (2008) (quoting
Australian Government, The World Heritage Convention, http://www.environment.gov.au/heri
tage/apfp/heritage/convention.htmI (last visited Nov. 9, 2009)).
2 Natasha Affolder, Democratising or Demonising the World Heritage Convention?, 38
VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 341, 341 (2007) (quoting Amy Ridenour, Keep the Statute of
Liberty Free: An Argument for Congressional Oversight of UN Land Designations in the US,
NAT'L POL'Y ANALYSIS No. 419 (July 2002), http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA419.html).
3 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation [UNESCO], Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage arts. 1-2, Nov. 16, 1972,27
U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter World Heritage Convention].
4 UNESCO.org, World Heritage List, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list (last visited Nov. 9,2009).
' See, e.g., The Permanent Observer of Palestine, Report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other
Arabs of the Occupied Territories, 1, delivered to the Security Council and the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/55/944-S/2001/491 (May 17, 2001) (reproducing additions to a letter
dated 15 May 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General "condemn[ing] Israel's dubious attempts to assert its sovereignty over
Jerusalem and certain areas of the West Bank by seeking to have a number of archeological
sites.., inscribed on the World Heritage List").
6 See Khmer's Hun Sen Congratulates Thai PM, NATION (Thail.), Sept. 20, 2008, http://
www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/09/20/politics/politics30083957.php (noting that "Cambodia
and Thailand have locked horns.., since June when Phnom Penh proposed to list the 11 th-
century Hindu temple of Preah Vihear as a World Heritage site").
' UNESCO, Intergov't Comm. for Prot. of World Cultural & Nat. Heritage, Operational
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is that each potential site must meet certain "conditions of integrity and/or
authenticity."' Finally, the nominating state must ensure that an adequate
system of protection and management of the site is in place prior to inscription
on the List.9 Absent from the selection criteria and the nomination and
selection processes at large, however, is any mechanism for dealing with sites
which are the source of, or otherwise involved in, political dispute.
This Note focuses on the current Thai-Cambodian dispute over the selection
of the Temple of Preah Vihear and also examines disputes concerning sites in
Eastern Asia, the Middle East, and Africa in light of the lack of a formal
provision dealing with political unrest surrounding site selection and
management. Ultimately, this Note argues for the inclusion of an explicit
mechanism to address political conflict in the Operational Guidelines for the
Implementation of the World Heritage Convention (the Guidelines) and the
creation of a UNESCO arbitrational body to resolve such conflicts as they arise
in the nomination and selection processes.
Part II examines the legal documents governing UNESCO, including the
World Heritage Convention and the nomination and selection processes
outlined in the Guidelines. Part III explores disputed site inscriptions by
focusing on the history of the Thai-Cambodian conflict surrounding the Temple
of Preah Vihear and its selection as a World Heritage Site in July 2008. This
part also examines disputes involving sites in China and the Koreas, Jerusalem,
and Virunga National Park in the Congo. Part IV proposes changes to the
Guidelines in accordance with the World Heritage Convention such that the
Selection Committee, when deciding whether or not to inscribe a site on the
List, would explicitly weigh certain political considerations: notice of intent to
nominate a site for inscription, independent legal support, conduct under
general principles of international law, and expressions of commitment.
Finally, this Note proposes that a UNESCO arbitrational body be created to
resolve such future disputes.
Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, 77, U.N. Doc. WHC.
08/01 (Jan. 2008) [hereinafter Guidelines].
8 Id. 78.
9 Id.
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II. UNESCO DOCUMENTS AND PROCEDURE
A. The World Heritage Convention
The General Conference of UNESCO adopted the World Heritage
Convention on November 16, 1972, but the momentum for an international
cooperative effort to protect cultural heritage began building much earlier, soon
after World War 1.10 The primary impetus for the creation of such an
international body occurred in the late 1950s when the Egyptian government
announced its decision to build the Aswan High Dam." This dam would have
flooded a valley containing some of Ancient Egypt's most important cultural
and architectural creations, most notably the Abu Simbel temples.' 2 Protecting
the threatened temples by relocating them required approximately $80 million,
half of which was given by over fifty nations in a demonstration of
international cooperation. 3 Similarly, efforts for the international protection
of natural treasures arose at a 1965 White House conference calling for a
"World Heritage Trust," and continued in 1968 when the International Union
for Conservation of Nature drafted a similar proposal. 4 In Stockholm, at
the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, the
Assembly first considered these two proposals; the proposals were then merged
into a single document, which the General Conference of UNESCO adopted
as the Convention on November 16th of that year. 5
The World Heritage Sites, which are considered exceptional examples of
cultural and natural importance for all of humanity, 6 are administered by the
UNESCO World Heritage Committee.'7 Inscription on the World Heritage List
is important to the nation that is home to the site because it gives that nation
" UNESCO.org, The World Heritage Convention, http://whc.unesco.org/en/convention/(last
visited Nov. 9, 2009).
SId.
12 See id. (calling the Temples "a treasure of Egyptian civilization").
t Id. The preservation costs for the project were substantial because the Egyptian
government decided to follow through with its plans to build the Aswan High Dam. The Abu
Simbel and Philae temples had to be "dismantled, moved to dry ground and reassembled." Id.
14 Id.
13 Id.
16 World Heritage Convention, supra note 3, pmbl.
17 UNESCO.org, World Heritage Committee, http://whc.unesco.org/en/comittee/ (last visited
Nov. 9, 2009).
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access to the World Heritage Fund and potential assistance from a variety of
other international sources.'8 Moreover, inscription raises public awareness
and can result in increased tourism. 9 As of the publication of this Note, 890
sites have been protected under the Convention.20
B. The Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage
Convention
While the Convention defines criteria for inscription of cultural and natural
heritage sites in deliberately broad terms,2' Article 11 charges the World
Heritage Committee (the Committee) with defining specific selection criteria.22
The Committee fulfilled this provision by embodying more specific selection
criteria in the Guidelines.2 3 In order to be inscribed on the List, a site must
meet at least one of these more specific criteria, which are outlined in the most
recent version of the Guidelines.24 Under the Guidelines, "[n]ominated
properties shall":
(i) represent a masterpiece of human creative genius;
(ii) exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a
span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on
developments in architecture or technology, monumental
arts, town-planning or landscape design;
(iii) bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural
tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has
disappeared;
18 UNESCO.org, Benefits ofRatification, http://whc.unesco.org/en/convention/#Benefits-of-
Ratification (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
'9 Id.; see also Clem Tisdell & Clevo Wilson, World Heritage Listing ofAustralian Natural
Sites: Tourism Stimulus and Its Economic Value, 32 ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 27, 29 (2002)
(noting that World Heritage listing may "promote[ ] increased tourism" and "raise[ ] the tourism
economic value of natural sites because such listing acts as a signalling device").
20 World Heritage List, supra note 4.
21 See World Heritage Convention, supra note 3, arts. 1-2 (describing in broad terms the
range of monuments, buildings, places, and natural features that could be protected under the
Convention).
22 Id. art. 11(2),(5).
23 Guidelines, supra note 7, M 77-79.
24 Id. 77.
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(iv) be an outstanding example of a type of building,
architectural or technological ensemble or landscape which
illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history;
(v) be an outstanding example of a traditional human
settlement, land-use, or sea-use which is representative of
a culture (or cultures), or human interaction with the
environment especially when it has become vulnerable
under the impact of irreversible change;
(vi) be directly or tangibly associated with events or living
traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and
literary works of outstanding universal significance. (The
Committee considers that this criterion should preferably
be used in conjunction with other criteria);
(vii) contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of
exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance;
(viii) be outstanding examples representing major stages of
earth's history, including the record of life, significant on-
going geological processes in the development of
landforms, or significant geomorphic or physiographic
features;
(ix) be outstanding examples representing significant on-going
ecological and biological processes in the evolution and
development of terrestrial, fresh water, coastal and marine
ecosystems and communities of plants and animals;
(x) contain the most important and significant natural habitats
for in-situ conservation of biological diversity, including
those containing threatened species of outstanding
universal value from the point of view of science or
conservation."
Importantly, the Guidelines do not require the Committee to directly
consider any relevant political discord surrounding proposed sites.
25 Id.
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C. Sites of Potential Conflict
Although the Committee is not explicitly bound to consider political discord
in its decisions, the Convention and Guidelines are not entirely silent as to
potential disputes. The Convention indicates that state consent is required for
inclusion on the List, and further indicates that "inclusion of a property situated
in a territory, sovereignty or jurisdiction over which is claimed by more than
one State shall in no way prejudice the rights of the parties to the dispute. ' 26
While this provision acknowledges the potential for political conflict
surrounding inscription of disputed sites, it fails to offer any guidance as to
how such disputes should be resolved or factored into the decision to add a site
to the List. Because the Convention indicates that disputed sovereignty over
a property would not prejudice the rights of the disagreeing parties to later seek
inscription under their respective names, it provides no incentive for the parties
to resolve the conflict themselves before seeking inscription.
If the Convention allowed for penalties against parties who fail to resolve
conflicts peacefully during the inscription process, then it might incentivize
nations to resolve disputes without violence or unsolicited third-party
intervention.
The Guidelines include more direction about site disputes than does the
Convention by listing criteria for placement on the List of World Heritage in
Danger, a list of threatened sites.27 Relevant to consideration of sites exposed
to dangerous conditions is the inclusion of factor (v), "outbreak or threat of
26 World Heritage Convention, supra note 3, art. 11 (3). The Guidelines contain a provision
for "transboundary nominations," which must conform to Article 11(3) "whenever possible,"
and recommend that "States Parties concerned establish a joint management committee or
similar body to oversee the management of the whole of a transboundary property." Guidelines,
supra note 7, 135. However, this provision is silent as to cases where State Parties do not
cooperate, as where sites are located on disputed borders.
27 Guidelines, supra note 7, 177-191. Instead of focusing on political conflict arising
between states, the Guidelines acknowledge the likely tension between individual state
sovereignty and the global interest in heritage preservation by stating the ideal that "[w]hile fully
respecting the sovereignty of the States on whose territory the cultural and natural heritage is
situated, States Parties to the Convention recognize the collective interest of the international
community to cooperate in the protection of this heritage." Id. 15; see also Affolder, supra
note 2, at 341-42 (examining "the extent to which problems of democracy can threaten to
undermine a regime created to hold states accountable for the protection of heritage within their
borders").
2009]
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armed conflict." 28 Consequently, a site that may be harmed by armed conflict
could be placed on the list of threatened sites to receive immediate assistance
allocated by the Committee from the World Heritage Fund.29 The Guidelines
also instruct Committee members to bear in mind that "it is often impossible
to assess certain threats-such as the threat of armed conflict-as to their effect
on cultural or natural properties ... ."30 This exhortation, while not a bright-
line rule, urges members to consider the problems associated with protecting
sites in battle zones. The armed-conflict factor is the closest that any of
UNESCO's governing documents come to expressly acknowledging political
discord when considering sites for inclusion on the List.
There are also certain procedural mechanisms, specifically in the
nomination and selection processes, that incorporate considerations of
politically sensitive issues. One example is the rule that only State Parties,
nations having signed the Convention, may submit proposals for properties
within their boundaries to be considered for inscription on the List.3'
There are several steps in this process and each provides a possible
safeguard. First, a State Party must submit a "Tentative List," an inventory of
potential sites for inscription; the Committee cannot consider a site for
nomination unless it has been previously listed on that Party's Tentative List.32
Second, the State Party must prepare a nomination file, including exhaustive
documentation and maps, which "the World Heritage Centre sends. . . to the
appropriate Advisory Bodies for evaluation. 33 Third, the International Council
2 See Guidelines, supra note 7, 179(b) (including other factors that "could have
deleterious effects on [the] inherent characteristics" of a site).
29 UNESCO.org, World Heritage in Danger, http://whc.unesco.org/en/158/ (last visited
Nov. 9, 2009).
30 Guidelines, supra note 7, 182(c)(ii).
"' UNESCO.org, World Heritage List Nominations, http://whc.unesco.org/en/nominations/
(last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
32 Id. This requirement could function as a procedural check for nations disputing sovereignty
over sites because inclusion on a State Party's Tentative List would serve as notice that the nation
believes the site in question to be under its sovereignty. A State Party might be less likely to
include a disputed site on its Tentative List if it feared doing so would incite hostility with a
neighboring country. UNESCO's webpage includes a linkto all proposed sites listed on aparty's
Tentative List, providing other nations with easy access to this information. UNESCO.org,
Tentative Lists, http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
33 World Heritage List Nominations, supra note 31. The extensive nomination file
requirements may function as another procedural check because, if the site truly was disputed,
the State Party's record would likely be considered incomplete with respect to the Committee's
rigorous standards. See, e.g., ROYAL GOv'T OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA, THE TEMPLE OF
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on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and the World Conservation Union
(IUCN) independently evaluate the nomination file and provide the Committee
with evaluations of the nominated sites.34 The World Heritage Committee
makes its final decision (pursuant to the selection criteria listed in the
Guidelines) at a meeting held once a year for that express purpose. 5 If
necessary, the Committee can "defer its decision and request further
information on sites from the States Parties. 36
Thus, while UNESCO's governing documents acknowledge sources of
political conflict, and the nomination and selection processes contain implicit
checks to discourage inscription of disputed sites, express guidance regarding
disputed sites is lacking. Several real-world examples serve as informative
case studies of the political ramifications stemming from the Committee's
failure to consider political strife in the selection process for inscribing sites on
the World Heritage List.
III. DISPUTES OVER WORLD HERITAGE INSCRIPTION
A. Introduction
Government protest over World Heritage inscription is not uncommon.
While some outcries result in violent conflict, most are formalistic and
unaccompanied by violent threats, economic embargo or any other form of
coercion.37
PREAH VIHEAR: PROPOSED FOR THE INSCRIPTION ON THE WORLD HERITAGE LIST (UNESCO)
(Council of Ministers eds., 2008), available at http://www.rfi.fr/cambodgien/actu/images/107
%5CPreahVihearProposed for inscription onUNESCO.pdf (exemplifying the amount of
detail typically included in nomination files). Moreover, the map requirement played an
important role in the Temple ofPreah Vihear case discussed below. Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15) (merits).
" World Heritage List Nominations, supra note 31. A third body, the International Centre
for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), provides the
Committee with "expert advice" on protection of cultural sites. Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. Though the Committee has not expressly stated it, the ability to defer and request
additional information may be yet another procedural mechanism by which the Committee may
weigh political stability when making an inscription determination. Specifically, the ability to
defer a decision may allow the Committee to base its decision on a long-term evaluation of the
dispute.
" See UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, 20th Sess., Mdrida, Mex., Dec. 2-7, 1996,
Report of the Twentieth Session, Annex V, U.N. Doc. WHC-96/CONF.201/21 (Mar. 10, 1997)
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For example, when the site of the atomic blast in Hiroshima, Japan was
added to the List, China expressed "reservations" and the U.S. delegate to the
U.N. dissociated from the inscription decision.3" China argued that listing of
Japan's Hiroshima might downplay the fact that "it was the other Asian
countries and peoples who suffered the greatest loss" during World War H.39
The U.S. delegate dissociated on the contention that war sites should be outside
the scope of the Convention and also that "events antecedent to the United
States' use of atomic weapons to end World War II are key to understanding
the tragedy of Hiroshima; [thus,] [a]ny examination of the period leading up
to 1945 should be placed in the appropriate historical context."4°  The
Hiroshima case differs from those of Preah Vihear and the Jerusalem sites
(discussed below) in that, although the inscription of the Hiroshima site incited
controversy, the site itself does not sit on disputed territory. In general, such
protest is innocuous and is to be expected as a form of political posturing; this
type of opposition generally lacks the threat of conflict.
41
B. The Temple of Preah Vihear
The most notable current dispute surrounding a site's registration on the
World Heritage List involves the Temple of Preah Vihear, located on the Thai-
Cambodian border. Initially built as a mountain hermitage, the Temple was
constructed on a site chosen by Suryavarman I,42 an eleventh century king of
the Khmer Empire,43 on a promontory of the Dangrek mountain range
(illustrating the type of formalistic dispute common to inscription protests).
38 Id.
39 Id.
o Id. Interestingly, despite the Untied States' protest that war sites should not be considered
within the scope of the Convention, La Fortaleza, a fort in San Juan, Puerto Rico, was listed as
an American World Heritage Site in 1983 because it "reflects developments in military
architecture during its service over the centuries as a fortress, an arsenal, [and] a prison ...."
UNESCO.org, La Fortaleza and San Juan National Historic Site in Puerto Rico, http://whc.une
sco.org/en/list/266 (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
41 These are not the type of conflicts this Note seeks to thoroughly examine but are relevant
in understanding the different degrees of controversy surrounding inscriptions. The largely
formalistic political stances, like that taken by the United States with regard to Hiroshima,
contrast with violent conflicts, like that occurring between Thailand and Cambodia.
42 CLAUDE JACQUES & PHILIPPE LAFOND, THE KHMER EMPIRE: CrIES AND SANCTUARIES,
FnfTH TO THE THIRTEENTH CENTURIES 149 (Tom White trans., River Books 2007).
41 Id. at 139.
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over 1,722 feet above a Cambodian plain." This unique mountain-top position
means that, despite the fact that the temple is located on Cambodian territory,
the only easy route of access to it is from the Thai side of the border.45
The cultural significance of this temple derives, in part, from a divine event
in Buddhist history. Expansive renovations by Suryavarman I were supposedly
inspired by the miraculous manifestation in physical form of a god on Earth.'
As a testament to this miracle, an inscription at the site reads, "His Majesty, by
the strength of his asceticism, brought it about that the god Bhadreshvara of
Lingapura came to reign over Shri Shikhareshvara to manifest his power
visibly, for the world to behold."'47
The dispute between Thailand and Cambodia over the Temple can be traced
back to a series of boundary settlements moderated by France from 1904
to 1908, while France was conducting the foreign relations of Indo-China and
Siam.4  Cambodia was, at that point, part of Indo-China.49  Of crucial
importance was the Treaty of 13 February 1904, which established the general
border between Thailand and Cambodia, leaving it to a Franco-Siamese Mixed
Commission (Mixed Commission) to determine the exact boundary. ° In the
eastern portion of the Dangrek Mountain Range where Preah Vihear is located,
the boundary was to follow the "watershed line."51  At a meeting on
December 2, 1906, the parties agreed that the Mixed Commission would travel
along the mountain range to carry out reconnaissance, with a French official to
survey the eastern part of the range to determine the exact boundary.52
Although the minutes of the meetings that occurred after December 2, 1906
contain no record of any boundary decisions, the plans were carried out, and
4 Id. at 149 (noting that the promontory is 525 meters above the Cambodian plain).
4' Gunfight on Thai-Cambodia Border, BBC NEWS, Oct. 15, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/asia-pacific/7668657.stm. Because the mountain-top location restricts access from the
Cambodian side, most tourists "cross the Thai border to enter Preah Vihear, where a Cambodian
flag flies prominently and a sign proclaims: 'I am proud to be a Khmer.' " In Pictures: Preah
Vihear, BBCNEwS, May 22, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/inpictures/7352186.stm (caption
to first picture).
' JACQUES & LAFOND, supra note 42, at 149.
47 Id
" Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 16 (June 15) (merits).
49 Id.
'o Id. at 17.
51 id.
52 Id. at 17-18.
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the President of the French section reported to the French Government in
January of 1907 that the frontier-line had been established."
The final stage of delineating the border required the production of maps. 4
Because the Siamese government "did not dispose of adequate means" for "the
execution of this technical works," it requested that French officers map the
region." The French officers completed "a series of eleven maps" in the fall
of 1907, and the maps were then given to the Siamese government. 6
Significantly, one of these maps placed Preah Vihear on the Cambodian side
of the border.57 The Mixed Commission never formally approved this map
because the Commission dissolved several months before production of the
official map. 8
In direct opposition to the French officers' findings, surveys conducted by
Thailand between 1934 and 1935 indicated that, based on the "true" location
of the watershed line, the Temple was actually located in Thailand.59 Despite
this revelation, the Thai Government continued to rely on and publish maps
indicating Preah Vihear's location on the Cambodian side of the border.'
Furthermore, when Prince Damrong of Siam visited the Temple in 1930, Siam
(now Thailand) did not protest his official reception by Preah Vihear
Province's French Resident.6' This would have been an opportune time for
Siam to contest Cambodian control of the site because Prince Damrong
probably would have considered reception by another government an affront
to Siamese sovereignty. However, Siam did not protest; moreover, Thailand
failed to object to the map in question during negotiations with Cambodia
concerning the 1925 and 1937 Franco-Siamese treaties over frontiers, where
"it would have been natural for Thailand to raise the matter, if she considered
the map ... to be incorrect. 6 2 Thailand similarly failed to raise the issue
before the Franco-Siamese Conciliation Commission in Washington, D.C.
in 1947, although this "was an outstanding opportunity for Thailand to claim
" Id. at 18.
54 Id. at 20.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 26.
51 Id. at 21.
59 Id. at 27.
6 Id.
61 Id. at 30.
62 Id. at 27-28.
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a rectification."'63 In fact, Thailand failed to raise the issue until 1958, in a
series of negotiations with Cambodia in Bangkok.' 4
The Thai-Cambodian dispute came to a head in 1962 in the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) when Cambodia brought charges against Thailand, and
the Court determined that the Temple belonged to Cambodia.65 At trial,
Cambodia relied on the map in question in support of its claim of sovereignty
over Preah Vihear. 6 Thailand countered, first, that the map was not
authoritative because it was not the work of the Mixed Commission; second,
the boundary shown was not accurate because it did not follow the true
watershed line as required by the Treaty of 13 February 1904; third, a boundary
along the watershed line would place the Temple in Thailand; fourth, Thailand
never accepted the map; and alternatively, that if Thailand had accepted the
map it had mistakenly done so, believing that the watershed line on the map
was accurate.67 Thailand also argued that it had no need to raise the issue
until 1958 because it had maintained possession of Preah Vihear "at all
material times. 6 8
The Court concluded that when the map was initially drafted it had no
binding authority.69 However, it went on to hold that the boundaries
established by that map would remain because Thailand failed to raise any
objection for over twenty years after discovering the error through the more
accurate survey.70
Put simply, the Court applied the laches doctrine to an international border
dispute. The decision was especially notable because "it amounted to a finding
that, in a conflict between a map not even referred to in the agreement or
signed by the parties and a boundary definition described in a treaty, the map
prevailed."' However, the judicial decision did not quell the ongoing border
dispute, which continues today.72
61 Id. at 28.
6 Id. at 27.
65 Id. at 36.
6 Id. at 21.
67 Id.
61 Id. at 29.
69 Id. at 21.
70 Id. at 32.
7' Hyung K. Lee, Comment, Mapping the Law of Legalizing Maps: The Implications of the
Emerging Rule on Map Evidence in International Law, 14PAC.RIML.&POL'YJ. 159, 171(2005).
72 See Editorial, Rallies Must Not Spill Over, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 15, 2009, at News,
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The dispute gained new life when Cambodia petitioned UNESCO to
inscribe Preah Vihear as a World Heritage Site in early 2008. On June 18th,
Thai Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama signed a joint communiqud with
Cambodia, signaling the parties' intent to cooperate in a joint attempt to have
Preah Vihear listed as a World Heritage Site.73 However, a week after the
signing of the joint communiqu6, in which the Thai Cabinet approved a
Cambodian map that would be submitted to UNESCO as part of its listing
requirements, Var Kimhong, Cambodia's border committee chairman,
announced the closing of the border crossing in response to a rally held by Thai
protestors at the Temple's gate.74 On July 8th, the Thai Constitution Court
declared the joint communiqud unconstitutional. 75 The Thai Court's ruling
caused political discord in Thailand when opponents of ousted Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra used it to incite nationalist fervor; the opposition party
asserted they would file petitions to impeach the Cabinet of Thailand following
the Court's ruling that Bangkok's support for Cambodia's inscription on the
World Heritage List was illegal. 76 That same day, UNESCO listed Preah
Vihear as a Cambodian World Heritage Site and Cambodians took to the streets
in celebration while Thais entered the Temple-which remained closed-in
protest.77 As part of the fallout from the Constitution Court decision, three
available at http://bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/23859/rallies-must-not-spill-over (noting
that unrest continues over Preah Vihear and rallies threaten to escalate to violence).
71 See Nophakhun Limsamarnphun, Opinion, Cambodia Should ConsiderJoint lnscription
ofPreah Vihear Site, NATION (Thail.), June 28,2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/seach/
read.php?newsid=30076732&keyword=Cambodia+should+consider+joint+inscription+Preah
+Vihear+Site (describing goals of the joint communiqud signed June 18, including the naming
of Preah Vihear as a World Heritage Site).
" Komfie Manalo, Cambodia Closes Border with Thailand at Preah Vihear Temple,
June 24, 2008, ALL HEADLINE NEws, http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7011368406.
71 Joint Communiqu with Cambodia is Unconstitutional, NATION (Thail.), July 8, 2008,
http://nationmultimedia.com/2008/07/08/headlines/headlines_30077585.php. The Constitution
Court voted eight to one because Pattama had failed to secure necessary parliamentary support.
The Court held that "[t]he Joint communiqud with Cambodia is considered a treaty in
accordance with the Vienna Convention [of] 1969 and the Thai Constitution's Article 190"
which means that it requires parliamentary approval before signing. Id.
76 Pracha Hariraksapitak, Thai Rulings Fuel Election Talk, PM Not Worried, REUTERS,
July 9, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbsslnvestmentServices/idUSBKK2838520080709?
sp--true.
71 Jonathan Head, Political Tensions Driving Temple Row, BBCNEWS, July 15, 2008, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7507425.stm.
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Thai ministers, including Foreign Minister Pattama who had approved the joint
communique, were forced to resign."
In the days following, both nations continued to build troop numbers along
the disputed border, although Thai and Cambodian leaders were planning a
peaceful discussion while Cambodia urged the withdrawal of Thai soldiers.79
By mid-July, approximately 1,500 combined Thai and Cambodian troops had
been stationed along the border.80 Cambodia finally sought help from the UN
Security Council "to avoid armed confrontation" after bilateral discussions at
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) failed to produce an
agreement.8' However, Thailand rejected third-party mediation. 2
On October 3rd, the troops stationed on the border exchanged gunfire for
the first time; at least three soldiers were injured in the brief confrontation. 3
Following the incident, Cambodia's Prime Minister, Hun Sen, and Thailand's
Foreign Minister, Sompong Amornwiwat, met in an effort to normalize the
situation, but the parties failed to come to a formal agreement." On
October 15th, Thai and Cambodian troops "exchange[d] ... small arms fire
and rocket-propelled grenades.., for about an hour"; two Cambodians were
killed and several soldiers on both sides were injured. 5 Following the clash,
"Thailand alerted air force jets and readied transport planes" in case they were
needed to evacuate Thai citizens from Cambodia as both sides attempted to
negotiate a ceasefire. 6
The situation remained tense in the following two months, but "[o]n
November 12, [Cambodian] Foreign Minister Hor Namhong and his Thai
counterpart agreed.., to reduce the troop buildup" and to establish the Thai-
78 Id.
71 See Troop Build-up at Hill-Top Temple, BBCNEwS, July 17,2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk'
2/hi/asia-pacific/7511417.stm (noting that 400 Thai troops and 800 Cambodian troops were
stationed in the area).
8o UNHelp Sought over Temple Row, BBC NEWS, July22,2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
asia-pacific/7518741.stm.
s' Id.
82 See id. (noting that "Thailand wants to resolve the dispute at a bilateral level" instead).
83 Three-Minute Border Skirmish Causes Injuries on Both Sides, FRANCE 24, Oct. 3, 2008,
http://www.france24.com/en/20081003-border-skirmish-injuries-cambodia-thailand-temple-Si-
Sa-Ket.
'4 Cambodia Warns Thailand to Stop Trespassing, USATODAY, Oct. 13,2008, http://www.
usatoday.com/news/world/2008-10-13-10765591 1_x.htm.
85 Gunfight on Thai-Cambodia Border, supra note 45.
8 Id.
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Cambodian Joint Border Commission, charged with demarcating and de-
mining the area near Preah Vihear. 7 In an unrelated incident, widespread
protests swept across Thailand in the aftermath of the Thai Court's decision
that Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej had breached the Constitution and was
forced to resign."8 The turmoil virtually suspended all of the Border
Commission's work, but incidentally resulted in decreased troop numbers.89
In late December, the parties agreed to resume talks at the end of
January 2009.90 As this Note goes to publication, the border conflict remains
ongoing. While the violence stems largely from independent political disputes
between Thailand and Cambodia, the World Heritage inscription process
contributed significantly to the controversy.
Despite safeguards in the UNESCO selection process and the Guidelines'
exhortations to consider the potential for violent dispute, UNESCO seems to
have paid little attention to the potential for armed conflict that resulted from
the listing of Preah Vihear as a Cambodian World Heritage Site. For instance,
in Thailand, nationalistic and militaristic sentiments were escalating as its
government was crumbling. Such signs did not bode well for a peaceful
resolution of the historical border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia.
Weighing in UNESCO's favor was the ICJ decision holding that the Temple
was situated on Cambodian territory9' and the fact that Thai Foreign Minister
Pattama, early in the summer of 2008, signaled an intent to cooperate with
Cambodia to have the Temple listed as a Cambodian site.92 In the end,
however, as UNESCO was making its final decision with respect to Preah
Vihear, Thailand's highest court was ruling on the illegality of the joint
87 Cheang Sokha, Thailand's Turmoil Delays Border Work, PHNOM PENH POST, Dec. 16,
2008, http://khmemews.net/2008/12/thailands-turmoil-delays-border-work/.
88 See Court Says Thai PM "MustResign, "BBCNEws, Sept. 9,2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/asia-pacific/7605838.stm (stating that the Court ruled Sundarevej violated Article 267 of
the constitution, which prohibits ministers from "having outside interests," when the prime
minister received compensation for hosting a TV cooking show called "Tasting and
Grumbling").
89 See Sokha, supra note 87 (noting that troop levels were reduced to a combined total of
sixty men-thirty on each side---"at the front line near the temple").
90 Cambodian-Thai Border Talks Setfor January, CHINA VIEW, Dec. 29, 2008, http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/29/content_10573505.htm.
91 Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15) (merits).
' Temple of Gloom: Court Verdict Stuns Government, NATION (Thail.), July 9,2008, http://
www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/07/09/headlines/headlines_30077664.php.
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communiqud and Cambodian officials were closing the border in response to
Thai protests. These would be the ultimate signs of problems ahead.
C. The Koguryo Sites
In another rancorous dispute, China, North Korea, and South Korea contested
each other's claims to a number of ruins dating back to the Koguryo (Goguryeo)
era.93 The claims centered on whether Koguryo was an independent Korean
kingdom or part of a larger Chinese nation.'
Regional tensions flared in 2004 when China applied to have several sites
inscribed on the World Heritage List, though North Korea had applied for
inscription of the sites two years earlier.9 5 Both nations claimed ownership to
the
sites on an ethnic basis, and each lays archaeological and
historical claim to the region and its heritage as the historical
patrimony of its people. Thus, in both countries, ownership of
national heritages and historic relics is deemed imperative in
establishing hegemony or legitimacy in the border region, and in
asserting sovereignty over the past.96
China interpreted Korean "historical claims to the region and its artistic
legacy as posing the threat of irredentism. 97 In other words, China may be
seeking to secure a claim to the sites out of a political concern that, should the
North Korean government fail, ethnic Koreans living in Manchuria-where
many of the remains are located-may attempt to secede and join a unified
Korea if the remains are not considered Chinese territory.98
" Yonson Aim, The Contested Heritage of Koguryo/Gaogouli and China-Korea Conflict,
JAPAN Focus, Jan. 11, 2008, http://japanfocus.org/-Yonson-Ahn/263 1.
94 Id.
95 Id.
% Id.
97 Id.
9' See Mark Byington, The War of Words Between South Korea and China over an Ancient
Kingdom: Why Both Sides Are Misguided, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK, Sept. 6,2004, http://hnn.
us/articles/7077.html (positing that one reason for China's claim to Koguryo maybe due to fears
that "any admission that Koreans might have a valid historical claim to some PRC territories
might incite unrest among other border grounds, particularly in the Southwest and Northwest").
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Tensions began building, however, prior to the 2004 petitions by China and
North Korea. Although China first invested substantial sums to preserve
Koguryo sites, North Korea was the first nation to petition the Committee,
in 2002, to consider the sites for inscription." 9 The Selection Committee
debated whether to include the sites during its 27th Committee meeting in Paris
in June 2003, but ultimately deferred consideration." Two years later, at the
Twenty-Seventh Committee meeting, the Committee elected to inscribe
Koguryo sites for both China and North Korea at the same time to avoid
inciting political tensions.'' UNESCO neutrally titled the listing "Capital
Cities and Tombs of the Ancient Koguryo Kingdom" in another attempt to
avoid political complications by remaining as unbiased as possible.0 2
However, the listing was "referred to as 'China's Koguryo' ... in the Chinese
media" and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs "deleted Kuguryo from a
summary of Korean history on its website."'13
South Koreans, in particular, took offense to these actions, which sparked
widespread protests and editorials condemning China's actions." In
April 2004, 63% of South Korea's National Assembly considered China "their
most important diplomatic partner"; a mere four months later, following the
actions by China, only 6% of lawmakers held the same view.' China
subsequently issued postage stamps celebrating "China's Kuguryo," which
further incensed South Koreans.0 6 The controversy over Koguryo's history
sparked a debate in both Koreas about Korean identity, and the sites' listings
became symbols both for distinguishing Korea from China and for unifying the
Ahn, supra note 93.
'0 UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, June 30-July 5, 2003, Decisions Adopted by
the 27th Session of the World Heritage Committee in 2003, at 109, WHC-03/27.COM1/24
(Dec. 10, 2003). The Committee's decision to defer serves as an example of a procedural
protection built into the nomination and selection processes. Specifically, the Committee can
defer consideration in order to gather more information and wait to see how political
disagreements may be resolved. See id. at 110 (requesting "that further steps be taken so that
the relevant remaining technical issue can be resolved with a view to considering the
nomination").
101 Ahn, supra note 93.
'02 See Peter H. Gries, The Koguryo Controversy, National Identity, and Sino-Korean
Relations Today, 22 E. ASIA 3, 3 (2005) (noting that the listing was an attempt by UNESCO to
"skirt[ ] the issue").
103 Id.
'04 Id. at 4.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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Korean nations, both of which reaffirmed China's concerns of irredentism. 10 7
North Korea's head delegate to UNESCO, Ri Ui Ha, asserted at a UNESCO
meeting following the 2004 inscriptions, that "Koguryo culture is the Korean
nation's common heritage, which unites our national blood vessels."10 8
In short, the positions taken by China and the Koreas have strained China's
relations with the two Koreas, while the events have brought North and South
Korea closer."° Thus, actions by State Parties originating from a seemingly
innocuous conservation listing substantially altered political relationships in
East Asia. Since 2006, the debate has shifted to Mount Changbai/Paekdu,
located in a mountain range straddling the Chinese-North Korean border and
considered sacred at the time of the Koguryo kingdom." 0
Although the Selection Committee attempted to minimize political tension
by inscribing the sites for both nations at the same time and listing the sites
with a neutral title, the listings have significantly shifted political relationships
in a volatile region."' While the listings have not resulted in armed conflict,
the subsequent shifts in political alliances may have important consequences
for Manchuria in a post-Kim Jong-il regime in North Korea. The Manchurian
province may become the center of a martial dispute between China and a
unified Korean peninsula.
D. Archeological Sites in East Jerusalem
There have, however, been contested attempts at World Heritage inscription
that are more similar to that surrounding the Temple of Preah Vihear than those
connected to the inscription of Hiroshima or the Koguryo sites. Most notably,
in February of 2001, Israel attempted to have archeological sites in East
Jerusalem listed as World Heritage Sites. As a result, Palestine submitted a
resolution to the UN Secretary-General asserting that Israel's attempt to have
the sites inscribed on the List was an attempt to have Israeli territorial views
validated by an international body in a way that would support Israel, yet
107 Aim, supra note 93.
log Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
... See id. (noting that since 2000, the listings of Koguryo and Mount Changbai/Paekdu have
caused tensions between China and the Koreas).
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circumvent independent political recognition." 2 After a conference the
following month, the League of Arab States issued a final communiqud and
adopted the Declaration of Amman, decrying "large-scale aggression being
waged by the Israeli occupation forces against the Palestinians, using all modes
of oppression and all types of weapons, including those internationally
prohibited .... ", In opposition to Israel's attempt to have archeological sites
listed, members of the League of Arab States "reaffirm[ed] their adherence to
the [UN] Security Council resolutions" regarding Jerusalem "which declare
null and void all measures taken, or to be taken, by Israel to change the
character of this city ... ."' "
As discussed in Part H, the Guidelines indicate the difficulty facing
Committee Members when assessing the threat of armed conflict and the harm
that such conflict may pose to potential sites. It can be difficult to predict
violence surrounding an inscription decision, as was the case with Preah
Vihear, because there, the Thai government had initially pledged to cooperate.
However, other situations are more predictable. For example, the nature and
duration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were probably strong indicators that
the inscription of certain Jerusalem sites as Israeli World Heritage Sites could
act as a catalyst for violent outbreaks.
In a more prudent measure than that taken in the Preah Vihear case, the
Selection Committee "postpone[d] further consideration of [the inscription of
archeological sites in Jerusalem] until an agreement on the status of the City of
Jerusalem in conformity with International Law [was] reached, or until the
parties concerned submit[ted] a joint nomination.""' 5 Evidencing the delicacy
of the situation, the UNESCO General Conference emphasized that "nothing
in the present decision [to postpone consideration] shall in any way affect the
'12 Report of the Special Committee, supra note 5; see also Davinia Filza Abdul Aziz, The
Utility of an International Legal Approach to the Jerusalem Question: Camera Obscura or
Camera Lucida?, 7 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 511, 520-21 (2003) (discussing Palestine's use
of the resolution to build on arguments that "locating the Palestinian capital in Jerusalem is
integral to fulfilling the Palestinian people's right to self-determination").
13 See The Permanent Representative of Jordan, Report Delivered to the Security Council
and the General Assembly, 6, U.N. Doc. A/55/892-S/2001/342 (Apr. 10, 2001) (reproducing
the communiqud as an Annex to the Letter dated April 6, 2001 from the Permanent
Representative of Jordan to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General).
114 Id. 14.
"5 UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, 25th Sess., June 25-30, 2001, Report of the
Rapporteur, at 57-58, U.N. Doc. WHC-2001/CONF.205/10 (Aug. 17, 2001).
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relevant United Nations resolutions and decisions, in particular the relevant
Security Council resolutions on the legal status of Jerusalem,""' 6 thus
addressing the concerns expressed in Palestine's resolution to the Secretary-
General.
UNESCO's decision to postpone selection of the sites in Jerusalem
exemplifies the procedural mechanisms by which the Committee may weigh
political stability when making an inscription determination. In this case, the
Committee recognized the possibility of violent consequences of the inscription
of sites in Jerusalem, and urged the disputing parties to seek a resolution, either
together or through international arbitration or adjudication." 7
A fundamental problem with expecting a UNESCO resolution of the Israel-
Palestine dispute over the Jerusalem sites is that the dispute is not confined to
the sites themselves, but instead is symptomatic of a much larger, historical
dispute. Violence between Israel and Palestine continues today, eight years
after Israel attempted to have the sites listed." 8 The magnitude of the dispute
resolution needed in this situation far exceeds the scope of the UNESCO World
Heritage Convention and Guidelines. These documents were intended to
protect sites of cultural and natural importance, not bring peace to war zones.
Consequently, expecting those documents and procedures to resolve such a
dispute is unrealistic.
An important question to consider is, why did the Committee decide to
postpone consideration of the Jerusalem sites, but decide to immediately
inscribe Preah Vihear? The two cases are similar in that both disputes involve
longstanding conflicts over sites of religious and cultural importance between
peoples that have historically been at odds with each other.
There are, however, important differences between these two cases which
may explain why the Committee decided them differently. First, an
international court determined that Preah Vihear was Cambodian property,
whereas there is no analogous decision regarding claims to Jerusalem and the
West Bank. 19 Second, the dispute between Thailand and Cambodia has largely
,16 UNESCO.org, Jerusalem, http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/1483 (last visited Nov. 9,
2009).
17 See Report of the Rapporteur, supra note 115, at 57 (requiring an agreement "in
conformity with International Law").
"' Taghreed El-Khodary& Isabel Kershner, Israeli Shells Kill 4O at Gaza U.N. School, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 7, 2009, at A12.
"9 Specifically, the International Court of Justice opinion provided the Selection Committee
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been a regional problem, whereas the Israeli-Palestinian dispute involves
various international actors. The Quartet on the Middle East, the body charged
with mediating Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, includes the United States,
Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations. 2' The violent conflict
between Thailand and Cambodia over Preah Vihear is a recent development,
and is limited to those two countries. Third, at the time Cambodia petitioned
UNESCO, Thai Foreign Minister Pattama had signed a joint communiqud
signaling an intent to cooperate with Cambodia to have Preah Vihear listed as
a Cambodian site,' 2 1 whereas the League of Arab States issued a resolution
protesting Israel's petition shortly after it was filed. All of these differences
may have factored into the Selection Committee's decisions to inscribe Preah
Vihear and yet postpone consideration of the Jerusalem sites.
E. Virunga National Park. Democratic Republic of Congo
Not only are culturally important sites threatened by armed conflict, but
important sites of biodiversity are also under siege. For example, certain
species inhabiting Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) are threatened due to "[t]he escalation of violence" in the area.'22
Specifically, the park "provides the habitat for the last populations of mountain
gorillas," and this habitat is "threatened by... persistent shooting.' 23
In response to the situation, UNESCO established a conservation project
in 2000 called "Biodiversity Conservation in Regions of Armed Conflict:
Protecting World Heritage in the Democratic Republic of the Congo."' 24 The
with an independent legal basis for awarding World Heritage status to Preah Vihear as a
Cambodian site.
20 Press Release, Middle East Quartet, Statement by Middle East Quartet, U.N. Doc.
SG/2091 (Sept. 23, 2004).
2' The Selection Committee explicitly relied on this joint communiqud when deciding to
inscribe Preah Vihear as a Cambodian site. UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, 32d Sess.,
Quebec City, Can., July 2-10, 2008, Decisions Adopted at the 32nd Session of the World
Heritage Committee, at 221, U.N. Doc. WHC-08/32.COM/24Rev (Mar. 31, 2009).
122 Press Release, UNESCO, Declaration by the UNESCO Director General Concerning
Virunga National Park, World Heritage Site (Oct. 30,2008) [hereinafter UNESCO Press Release
on Virunga National Park], available at http://portal.unesco.org/en.php-URLID=43814&UR
L_DO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html.
123 UNESCO Press Release on Virunga National Park, supra note 122.
124 UNESCO.org, Biodiversity Conservation in Regions of Armed Conflict: Protecting World
Heritage in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, http://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/83/ (last
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project's goal is to "ensure the conservation of World Heritage Sites in the
DRC both during periods of civil unrest and the long term, by mobilizing
financial, logistical, technical and diplomatic support at the regional and
international levels ....,25 Moreover, the project is supposed to serve as a
long-term "learning process to inform efforts and develop mechanisms to
conserve similar[ly threatened] sites .... ,126
Virunga National Park differs from the aforementioned cases in two
important ways. First, the Selection Committee inscribed Virunga National
Park based on its biodiversity and natural importance as opposed to cultural or
historical importance.127 Second, Virunga National Park was selected as a
World Heritage Site prior to the current threat of armed conflict, whereas
controversy over Preah Vihear, Hiroshima, Koguryo, and Jerusalem
surrounded the inscription process itself.
While the Virunga project is an ex post conservation measure, as opposed
to an ex ante dispute-resolution tool, it may still offer guidance in shaping
changes to UNESCO's selection documents to account for political instability
surrounding site-selection considerations. Specifically, one of the project's
primary aims is to use "diplomatic interventions to convince leaders and others
[sic] authorities in all concerned States of the need to ensure the security of the
working environment and for the conservation [sic] personnel and
equipment. 1 21 Similar diplomatic interventions could prove useful in
encouraging other nations to issue joint resolutions for World Heritage
consideration. The inclusion of diplomatic intervention tools is just one of
many changes that could be made to UNESCO's guiding documents; other
possible changes are discussed below.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION
As noted in Part II, the Guidelines do not explicitly require the Selection
Committee to consider any political discord surrounding proposed site
visited Nov. 9, 2009).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See UNESCO Press Release on Virunga National Park, supra note 122 (noting that the
park "comprises an outstanding diversity of habitats").
'28 Biodiversity Conservation in Regions of Armed Conflict, supra note 124.
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inscription. However, the Guidelines do instruct Committee members to
carefully consider potential sites exposed to dangerous conditions, as well as
allow for inclusion on the World Heritage in Danger List, which provides
access to the World Heritage Fund.'29
In practical terms, the protections inherent in the nomination and selection
processes provide the most substantive mechanisms by which Committee
members may evaluate political instability. The cases of Preah Vihear and the
sites in Jerusalem serve as instructive examples of how Committee members
may employ these procedural safeguards. For example, the nomination criteria
require notice in that a State Party must include the potential sites on its
tentative list, thus indicating its belief in sovereignty over the site in
question."' In all of the above examples, the State Party petitioning for
inscription listed the site in question on its tentative list, thus providing notice
to all other parties and giving those parties an opportunity to object prior to
inscription. For example, when Israel petitioned to have the sites in Jerusalem
inscribed, Palestine quickly protested. In the case of Jerusalem, the Committee
demonstrated how the postponement option could allow for more prudent
decision making. Further, Cambodia's nomination file should have put
Thailand on alert because it contained the 1907 map with the incorrect
watershed demarcations that placed the Temple on Cambodian soil.
Based on the armed-conflict factor of the World Heritage in Danger List and
the Committee's use of procedural safeguards to try to make judicious
inscription decisions in the cases of Preah Vihear, Koguryo, and Jerusalem, it
appears that UNESCO members intend to make decisions that will not result
in political discord. For example, in the Koguryo case, the Committee tried to
strike a middle ground by jointly inscribing sites and inscribing those sites
under neutral names. Conflict persisted when the nations involved used the
inscriptions as propaganda to stoke nationalist sentiments. However, when the
Committee decides to inscribe a site, it tries to do so in a way that will
minimize controversy.
Because the reasoning behind the decisions in those cases was left largely
undocumented, little guidance is provided for future cases. Instead, explicit
129 World Heritage in Danger, supra note 29. But, providing access to the World Heritage
Fund may actually be counterproductive in instances of armed conflict if the government
receiving these funds uses the assistance funds to finance the conflict. UNESCO and UN
oversight must ensure that funds are not used to finance war but to conserve endangered sights.110 World Heritage List Nominations, supra note 3 1.
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directions in the Guidelines for documenting the reasoning behind listing
decisions could remedy this inadequacy. For example, the Guidelines could
require Committee members to draft an opinion, analogous to ajudicial opinion
illustrating the reasoning behind a judge's ruling, which would state the reason
a site was listed and provide precedent for future cases.
Based on the Committee's decisions in the aforementioned case studies,
several guiding principles can be divined. First, notice is of critical
importance. While it should be obvious that a country considers that it has
sovereign control over a site it has included on its tentative list, the Guidelines
should include formal language indicating as much to potential objectors in the
absence of a co-operational joint petition or where the petitioning nation
indicates otherwise. Such formal language would preclude a potential objector
from arguing that it did not have notice. The petitioning state's actions, in
conjunction with the explicit language in the Guidelines, would provide a legal
basis for denying a hearing to an objector based on lack of notice. Such
language would result in greater vigilance of states in regards to the inclusion
of sites on tentative lists. This vigilance at an early stage would hopefully
result in peaceful protest and resolution before violence could result.
Second, Committee members should directly consider any independent
legal support for inscription of sites as belonging to a particular nation. Such
an independent legal basis would weigh in favor of a site being listed. When
deciding to inscribe Preah Vihear as a Cambodian site, the Committee found
support in the ICJ's 1962 decision. There was no analogous decision
supporting Israel's petition and such an absence of precedent, in conjunction
with other factors, may have contributed to the Committee's decision to
postpone inscription. There was also no independent legal support regarding
Koguryo, but the parties in that case decided to have the sites jointly inscribed.
The Guidelines should include language indicating that the Committee will
take independent legal support into consideration when making inscription
decisions.
Independent legal support is important because it provides a third-party
assessment of the conflict in a court where concerned states submit to its
jurisdiction. Because the parties submit to jurisdiction in a particular case, it
would only be fair to honor the outcome of that decision. More specifically,
cases like Temple ofPreah Vihear are important because they obviate the need
for subsequent, alternate dispute resolution unless circumstances have
substantially changed. This would save UNESCO time and money by freeing
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it from mediating or conducting hearings in cases where an independent legal
decision already exists. However, binding the states to an ICJ decision, or that
of another court, could have the adverse, unintended effect of disincentivizing
states from seeking resolution in those courts in the first place.
Third, as discussed in Part III, general legal principles such as laches and
estoppel have implicitly guided Committee decisions in the past. Language in
the governing documents should therefore explicitly indicate that such
generally accepted norms will inform Committee decisions. Put differently,
because the Committee relies on legal determinations made by courts that rule
based on general principles of international law, the Committee is already,
albeit indirectly, basing its decisions on the same principles. For example, the
principle of custom is generally accepted in courts of international law, such
as the ICJ, and the Committee in turn relies on judgments by those courts.
Custom is a generally accepted source of international law and requires both
general practice and its acceptance as international law.' If ICJ decisions
would explicitly inform Committee decisions, then it follows that principles,
such as custom, which guide international court decisions,'32 should also inform
Committee decisions. If this is true, then language indicating as much should
be explicitly included in the Guidelines so that states do not have to do the
guess-work.
Fourth, expressions of commitment to cooperate should weigh in favor of
inscription, as opposed to postponement of such a decision. In the Preah
Vihear case, Thailand had signed ajoint communiqu6 indicating its willingness
to cooperate with Cambodia in having the Temple inscribed. Even though
Thailand later retracted that commitment, at the time the Committee was
making its decision, it was under the impression that Thailand was willing to
cooperate. While there was no previous indication of cooperation between
China and the Koreas regarding Koguryo, the nations' willingness to have the
sites jointly inscribed indicated a willingness to cooperate. Conversely, there
was no such commitment between Israel and Palestine and the Committee
consequently postponed inscription until a consensus between Israel and
Palestine could be reached. Again, while it should be obvious, the Guidelines
131 Loiu F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 59 (4th ed.
West Group 2001) (1980).
132 See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (demonstrating
the use of custom in international courts).
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should include language that once a State Party has demonstrated an intent to
cooperate with an inscription, barring unforeseen or extraordinary
circumstances, that party cannot later protest the inscription.
However, the parties would still have obligations to cooperating nations
once a site had been listed. Specifically, once a State Party has demonstrated
an intent to cooperate, particularly in cases of joint inscription, parties should
be precluded from using that inscription as a way to provoke the joint
inscriber(s), as China did when it ignored the Koguryo's neutral listing name
and referred to the sites in a self-serving way at the expense of the Koreas. By
doing so, China undermined the Committee's deliberate efforts to minimize
controversy in East Asia. Consequently, the Guidelines ought to include
requirements prohibiting such conduct.
For example, the Guidelines could include penalties for acting as China did.
However, such penalties probably would not be realistic because of the need
for an international watchdog to determine whether there was a breach and then
enforce the chosen penalty. In most cases, the costs of such enforcement would
likely outweigh any benefits. Such preclusion might exacerbate existing
tensions between state sovereignty and common heritage inherent in the
concept of a World Heritage Site.'33
While the Committee's decisions seem to have been based, in part, on four
general principles-notice, independent legal support, general principles of
international law, and expressions of commitment-the explicit inclusion of
these principles in the Guidelines would likely be insufficient to remedy
political strife resulting from controversial inscriptions. This is because, while
notice does prevent nations from pleading ignorance after an altercation has
occurred, notice alone may not deter nations from violent conflict in the first
place. Thus, other safeguards should be implemented to protect endangered,
potential World Heritage Sites before nations resort to armed conflict.
UNESCO has begun to experiment with independent bodies and diplomatic
responses to environmental-conservation crises that could serve as models to
develop other bodies to protect culturally important sites threatened by conflict.
For example, the diplomatic bodies and procedures used to protect Virunga
33 A common critique of the Convention is that it protects common heritage at the expense
of state sovereignty. See, e.g., Affolder, supra note 2, at 342 ("The Convention is marked by
unresolved tension between state sovereignty and the recognition that certain structures, sites and
areas constitute the heritage not just of individual nations, but of humankind.").
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National Park, a site of environmental importance, could be used as a model to
create a similar body to protect sites of cultural importance.
One of the Virunga Park Project's primary aims is to use diplomatic
intervention to achieve conservation goals. Specifically, the group is to
"[w]rite appeals and organize diplomatic missions by high level UN officials
and/or other leading international and African personalities to relevant
governments. ... "'34 At a local level, the group is to "[]iaise with military and
,,135rebel authorities to facilitate continuation of conservation activities ....
While such diplomatic tactics are not revolutionary, the Committee reported
early success with the tactics, 136 and similarly adapted tactics could be useful
in diffusing situations like that at Preah Vihear.
In short, the Virunga National Park project is a comprehensive approach to
protect a World Heritage Site under siege. The Virunga problem differs
importantly from the disputes previously examined in that those controversies
surrounded the inscription process itself. Consequently, while lessons can be
learned from the Virunga project, a more narrowly tailored, independent
dispute-resolution board could be created to evaluate cases for potential
political unrest and to mediate disagreements between nations prior to
inscription. While several independent bodies evaluate nomination files and
offer recommendations to the Committee, 37 those bodies only determine
whether the sites in question are sufficiently important, historically or
culturally, to merit such protection. They do not consider current political
contexts.
A body independent from the World Heritage Committee could be created
for three primary purposes: to evaluate political discord between interested
parties, to hear grievances from interested parties, and to make formal
recommendations to the Committee to deny, postpone, or grant inscriptions.
The goal of this body would be to serve as an ex ante dispute-resolution tool
intended to quell arguments before violent conflict could result. First, the body
,' UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, 25th Sess., Helsinki, Fin., Dec. 11-16, 2001,
Progress Report on the UNESCO/DRCIUNFIP Project 243ZAI70, 3.2.1., U.N. Doc. WHC-
01/CONF.208/INF.4.
135 Id. 3.2.3.
136 See id. at 25 (noting that "[i]nternational and diplomatic support is the sphere of activity
that has begun implementation fastest").
131 Most notable are the International Council on Monuments and Sites and the World
Conservation Union, discussed above.
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could independently evaluate the political situation surrounding the site in
question. It could hear testimony from experts and consider other evidence on,
among other considerations, the history of the dispute and the degree of threat
faced by the site. After conducting such inquiries, the body could hear
testimony from representatives of the interested nations.
The composition of the body would be integral to its objective hearing
capacity. The body could be composed of members from neutral State Parties
as well as those parties involved in the dispute. This would require
representatives from concerned states to discuss the situation diplomatically.
However, given such a composition, hearings could devolve into political
posturing and finger-pointing.
Consequently, it may be more prudent to have the body composed entirely
of neutral state representatives and allow interested state representatives to
petition the body. In this respect, the body would resemble an arbitration or
mediation committee. Hearings conducted by such a body would consolidate
the interested parties' motions, as opposed to the periodic complaints that are
currently issued directly to the Committee. Moreover, this independent body
would be more responsive because it could rule on hearings on a rolling basis,
whereas the Committee would have to postpone a decision until a World
Heritage Committee meeting.
After hearing evidence and arguments, the independent body would make
recommendations to the Committee on whether the site in question should be
listed. Such a recommendation would provide another independent basis for
the Committee's decision and would serve to formalize the Committee's
decision as to whether to grant, postpone, or deny an inscription request.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not controverted that certain places and structures are so culturally,
historically, or environmentally important that they should be cherished and
protected for future generations. However, when this sentiment is considered
in light of local controversies, then the issue of how to protect those sites can
become extremely contentious. Particularly when multiple nations or peoples
lay claim to the same site, the political, cultural, and religious realities can
thwart the laudable goals of world heritage conservation. Bickering can
trivialize the cultural, historical, or environmental importance of a site and
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threaten that site's very existence. Thus, the need to protect a disputed site
becomes all the more urgent.
In the vast majority of cases, the UNESCO World Heritage Convention and
the Operational Guidelines function exactly as they are intended. However,
sites of disputed legacy or sovereignty are often those most in need of
protection, and UNESCO documents and procedures could be better adapted
to that end.
Basic political posturing with respect to listings-as seen in the Hiroshima
case-is largely innocuous, expected, and probably ineradicable. Some
disputes-like that between Israel and Palestine over sites in Jerusalem-are
part of much larger disputes beyond UNESCO's intended scope. In other
cases-like that involving the Koguryo sites-UNESCO documents and
procedure seem to function as intended; however, acts by parties following
inscription undermine the purposes underlying World Heritage listing and
importantly alter regional alliances. The Preah Vihear case most loudly
demands the need for revisions and additions to World Heritage documents as
to what sources and actions should inform Committee decisions. It also
highlights the need to form a body to evaluate political discord between the
interested parties, and to make formal recommendations to the Committee to
deny, postpone, or grant inscriptions.
The Committee's decision on Preah Vihear seemed uncontroversial at the
time based on the ICJ decision and the joint communiqu6. However, the fact
that the joint communiqu6 was struck down by Thailand's high court on the
day of the inscription, and that Thailand erupted in protest and riots, indicated
a much more complex picture. The border war that erupted shortly thereafter
indicates the need for a more cautious approach to potentially inflammatory
listings.
The recommendations offered in this Note are neither drastic nor complex.
UNESCO should explicitly include certain factors-notice, independent legal
support, general principles of international law, and expressions of
commitment-that guide Committee decisions and should offer reasoning for
those decisions. This is not likely to curb political disagreement surrounding
the site-selection process. It will, however, preclude objecting parties from
pleading ignorance and force those parties to consider how their actions would
be considered during a site-selection evaluation. Similarly, parties will likely
continue to bicker despite the existence of a body intended to evaluate political
context, hear disputes, and offer a recommendation based on that hearing.
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However, the hope is that if the parties are provided with a forum for peaceable
resolution, they will not resort to armed conflict as they did at Preah Vihear.
There will never be consensus surrounding World Heritage inscriptions, but
UNESCO should seek to do all that it can to minimize conflict, protect human
life, and preserve the world's greatest monuments to human achievement and
natural creation for untold generations to come-a true heritage for the world.

